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ABSTRACT

The challenge of preserving a user’s location privacy is more important now than
ever before with the proliferation of handheld devices and the pervasive use of location
based services. To protect location privacy, we must ensure k-anonymity so that the user
remains indistinguishable among k-1 other users. There is no better way but to use a
location anonymizer (LA) to achieve k-anonymity. However, its knowledge of each
user’s current location makes it susceptible to be a single-point-of-failure. In this thesis,
we propose a formal location privacy framework, termed SafeGrid that can work with or
without an LA. In SafeGrid, LA is designed in such a way that it is no longer a single
point of failure. In addition, it is resistant to known attacks and most significantly, the
cloaking algorithm it employs meets reciprocity condition. Simulation results exhibit its
better performance in query processing and cloaking region calculation compared with
existing solutions. In this thesis, we also show that satisfying k-anonymity is not enough
in preserving privacy. Especially in an environment where a group of colluded service
providers collaborate with each other, a user’s privacy can be compromised through
identity inference attacks. We present a detailed analysis of such attacks on privacy and
propose a novel and powerful privacy definition called s-proximity. In addition to
building a formal definition for s-proximity, we show that it is practical and it can be
incorporated efficiently into existing systems to make them secure.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The use of Location Based Services (LBS) has become ubiquitous with the growth of
handheld devices, PDAs, smart phones and GPS enabled cars. LBSs will flourish even
more with the surge of new genre of information systems. While requesting for a location
based service, a user can easily mask his identity using un-linkable pseudonyms [Hoh05]
but he needs to provide his location information, even if with less precision. The location
service provider (LSP) or an adversary, who secretly listens to the communication channel
between a user and the LSP, builds his own chronological record of location data over the
period of time. Later this knowledge might be used by him with techniques like
correlation attack, restricted space identification [Gruteser03], observation identification
[Gruteser03, Mokbel06] etc to link the records with actual user identity. The user’s
personal preference, state of health, political view etc can be even inferred from the places
he visits or visited. No wonder, his mail boxes may be inundated with unwanted
advertisements. This is location privacy violation and due to its possible aftermaths
preservation of an individual’s location privacy is of utmost importance.
There are several ways to thwart location privacy violation. One obvious solution is to
obfuscate, i.e. deliberate degradation of geographic position [Duckham05], the location
of the query issuer but it degrades the quality of service. Most importantly, the query
requester cannot be sure of meeting his k-anonymity [Hoh05] (i.e. in his obfuscated
region there are at least k-1 other users) requirement in this process as he does not know
the actual position of other users. Achieving k-anonymity in location privacy requires that
the probability of an attacker re-identifying a user from the obfuscated region does not
exceed 1/k [Monjur09].

Indeed, the user can communicate with his peer devices,
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establish trust, share location among them and thereby construct a region where his kanonymity is satisfied [Chow06, Hashem07]. However, in pervasive environment,
establishing trust takes time and due to mobility of the devices such peer group has shortlived existence [Satya96] which makes peer-based systems infeasible. Yet another and
most widely accepted way is to use Location Anonymizer (LA) [Gruteser03, Gedik05,
Gedik08, Ghinita07, Bamba08, Kalnis07] which sits between users and LSPs. All
subscribed users provide their exact locations to the LA periodically. This enables LA to
construct a bounded region, known as cloaked region (CR), for each user, satisfying their
k-anonymity and other privacy requirements. LA is, however, not the ultimate solution
because:
1) LA is a bottleneck in communication.
2) Each user has to give his exact location and for that LA is attractive to adversaries
(possibly a Big Brother) as compromising it means gaining all the user location data.
3) The user needs to secure the communication channel with LA which is costly.
4) Some cloaking techniques are very costly in both computation by LA and query
processing by LSP.
5) There are well known passive attacks against most of the cloaking techniques
[Kalnis07, Gruteser03] and
6) All of the existing cloaking techniques (except [Ghinita07] & [Talukder10]) fail to
meet reciprocity condition [Kalnis07].
The reciprocity condition necessitates that every user in an anonymization set (AS)
also generates the same AS for the given anonymity requirement (i.e. k) [Kalnis07].
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In this thesis, we present an efficient location privacy safeguard, titled SafeGrid that
makes best use of both obfuscation and cloaking techniques and it can be used with or
without an LA depending on the user’s choice. In SafeGrid, we divide the entire space
into obfuscation cells and these cells are built from all the users’ obfuscation
requirements. Instead of giving his location to LA the user provides one or more
obfuscation cells. In fact, SafeGrid negotiates with the user the degree of obfuscation
required in the event a location anonymizer is compromised. Obfuscated cells are
negotiated earlier and updated after a considerable period of time. LA in SafeGrid uses a
cloaking technique that strictly meets reciprocity condition [Ghinita07, Kalnis07]. In this
approach, all LBSs have prior knowledge of the obfuscation cells so that they can preprocess POIs for each cell and can readily provide results to LA or the user.
Although SafeGrid provides performance gain and enhanced attack resistance, the
cloaking algorithm is based on satisfying k-anonymity. However, in this thesis we argue
that k-anonymity does not provide sufficient protection against privacy violation. We
present two attacks, the heterogeneity attack and the conformity attack, and we show how
they can be used to compromise a k-anonymous location based query. The heterogeneity
attack reveals that k-anonymity can create groups that fail to provide overall anonymity
due to lack of sufficient match among the members with respect to some sensitive user
attribute. Likewise, approaches satisfying only k-anonymity disregard consequences of
revealing important context [Talukder08] information though the service request and
pave the way for conformity attack. Besides illustrating the attacks with real world
examples, we have provided their formal definitions which clarify how they relate to the
contexts [Talukder08] of the query and static information [Machanavajjhala06] of the
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users in the anonymity set (AS) [Machanavajjhala06]. Most of the existing approaches
[Mokbel06, Gruteser03, Kalnis07, Ghinita07, Gedik05, Duckham05, Ghinita08] are
vulnerable to these attacks as they undergo following problems.
1) They choose k number of users for constructing a CR on the basis of current locations
of the users only ignoring any other relevant static attribute of the users being grouped
together.
2) Most of the approaches forward the query to the LSP without making any
modification. However, a query that contains request for a specialized service may
disclose a number of contexts and static user information on those contexts hastens reidentification.
3) They do not consider preference of users regarding any other contexts of their interest
beyond location on the basis of which they want anonymization.
As an attempt to guard against the above mentioned attacks we have introduced a new
notion of privacy, called s-proximity, which requires that each anonymity set (AS)
contains at least s members belonging to the equivalence class of the query issuer. An
equivalence class is defined to consist of users having high correlation with the actual
query requester with respect to a set of static user attributes [Machanavajjhala06]. With
this new privacy parameter a user’s privacy profile [Mokbel06] takes the form of
< ݇, ݏ, ܣ >. We propose a pragmatic solution that offers services with such privacy
protection. Our approach, i.e. the SafeGrid framework, uses a trusted third party to
mediate user’s query to the LSP. In order to incorporate the s-proximity measure, we
consider the trusted third party to be equipped with more capabilities and extended
functionalities. We call this trusted third party Context Aware Location Anonymizer (c-

5
LA) as it is featured with additional modules for context based query generalization,
proximity group formation as pre-steps of CR generation. We propose a novel algorithm
called Selective Nearest Neighbor (SNN) for AS construction and CR generation. A
formal proof establishes that SNN provides enhanced privacy by reducing the probability
of re-identifying the actual query issuer. Implementation of the system validates the
feasibility of our proposed approach.
In summary, the contribution of this thesis lies in designing a LBS framework which
improves both performance gain and attack resistance. The proposed framework,
SafeGrid never uses the user’s exact location; neither in communication nor in
computation. LA in it has none of the above mentioned problems. Evaluation shows its
better performance in CR construction and query processing with less number of POIs
returned to the client than any of the known works in literature. It meets a user’s kanonymity every time, if the required k is not greater than total number of subscribed
users. In addition, whatever may be the required k, achieved k for each user is close to
maximum of all k. Most notable feature of our approach is that it generates CRs which
meet reciprocity condition. A number of attacks can be formulated if the cloaking
technique does not satisfy reciprocity condition. In addition, we have proposed a novel
privacy measure called s-proximity and shown how our approach meets reciprocity
condition along with s-proximity. We have presented several attacks on location privacy
and unintentional identity inference with illustrative examples and shown that the
cloaking techniques that satisfy reciprocity condition and s-proximity can overcome those
attacks. We have conducted extensive performance analysis of our proposed model.

6
Evaluation results demonstrate its feasibility as a practical solution and improvement
over existing approaches.
The outline of the rest of this thesis is: Chapter 2 contains background information. The
proposed grid based location privacy framework has been described in Chapter 3. The
details of identity inference protection and enhancements to the initial framework are
provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains the current state-of-the-art and related work.
The comparative analysis and experimental results of our approach are presented in
Chapter 6. Finally, our future research direction and concluding remarks can be found in
Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2: Background

This section discusses definitions and brief descriptions of relevant technical
terms used throughout the thesis, in order to facilitate understanding of the materials
presented.

2.1 Pervasive Computing
Pervasive computing is the notion of making computing services available
anytime, anywhere and on demand basis to the user [Robinson04]. Starting its journey as
“Ubiquitous computing” at Mark Weiser’s [Weiser91] Xerox PARC lab (through his
seminal paper in 1991), it has emerged as “the computing for the 21st century”. This
technology is especially a synergy of diversified concepts such as mobile computing,
wireless network, embedded computing, context-awareness with sensor technology and
human computer interaction. The pervasive computing environment comprises devices of
heterogeneous platforms and capability. Despite the advancement of handheld device
technology (e.g. PDAs, smart phones, etc.) in recent years, these devices are suffering
from a number of challenges to date [Satya96, Want05], which include but are not
limited to inadequate processing capability, restricted battery life, limited memory space,
frequent disconnection, and limited bandwidth. The applications developed for this
environment emphasize performance, and the efficient and stingy usage of resources in
the devices.
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2.2 Context
We reiterate the formal definition of Context from A. Dey: “Context is any
information that can be used to characterize the situation of the entity. An entity is a
person, place or object that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an
application, including the user and applications themselves” [Dey01]. Pervasive
computing environment is intended to facilitate humans to convey situational information
or contexts through widening the conversational bandwidth. This richness of
communication sets apart the context-aware applications from the traditional
applications. Location is the most common form of context found in Location based
Applications and is readily available through global positioning systems (GPS).
Distributed systems are using the location information available from underlying
communication infrastructure, for instance cell information in cellular networks such as
GSM [Schmidt99]. Contexts may take the form of human factors such as personal
information about the user (knowledge of habits, emotional state, bio-physiological
conditions), the user’s social environment (co-location of others, social interaction, group
dynamics), and the user’s tasks (spontaneous activity, engaged tasks, general goals).
Likewise, context related to the physical environment can be location (absolute position,
relative position, co-location), infrastructure (surrounding resources for computation,
communication, task performance), and physical conditions (noise, light, pressure)
[Schmidt99].
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2.3 Location based Service
Location based Application or Location based Service (LBS) is a special form of
context-aware application, where only location information is used as contextual
information and included inside the query. Some of the interesting applications are worth
discussing before we delve into their privacy concerns. Here are some of them:
Tracking service: This service allows a user to locate another person when some time and
location constraints are met. For example, in order to offer quality service to their
customers, employers may need to track employees’ whereabouts and modify the nearest
employee’s work schedule to meet customer needs. Parents may want to track their
children through cell phones while their children are roaming in a particular area.
FindYourChild [FindChild] provides such services to its cellular phone subscribers. And
more recently, PocketFinder Application [PocketFinder], downloadable through G1
phones preloaded with Google Android, provides the same service in US.
Buddy Finder: This is a friend finder application that runs on mobile handheld devices
and allows groups of friends to show one another exactly where they are and what they're
doing. The example of such an application is Buddy Beacon [BuddyBeacon], which is
available for most mobile phones including iPhone and allows the users to connect with
their friends even across different carriers. The difference between the tracking service
and Buddy Finder service is that the location update information is sent to friends only
with the user’s approval.
What’s Here?[Gunter04]: This is essentially a local search service for events and places
in a locality. Examples include a list of forthcoming events in a particular building,
tourist points of interest, or the route to the nearest restaurants. The location queries are
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made through an Anonymizer in order to hide the user’s exact location information from
the Location based Server. iPhone application Earth Comber [Earth Comber] is able to
find and notify the user on the closest free WiFi hotspots, coffee joints, pubs, eateries,
fuel, stores, ATMs, live music, movies by title and much more.
Calendar service, bulletin board service (Constraint based on presence of the owner of
the resource or the requester of the service): Data from these services will be shared with
the requester of the service based on some location constraints being met by the request
issuer [Hengartner06]. For example, the requester may have to reside inside the office of
the owner of the information in order to get access to the information. The owner of the
resource is in charge of setting the time and location preferences for accessing the
information.
Personal navigator (Campus Locator Service): The service can help a person find out
locations around the campus through a central location server or by accessing a local
database search, sensing the nearby access points. The latter technique requires the
mobile device to keep a local database that maps sensed access points to campus
locations. To learn more details about the technique, please refer to the Related Work
chapter for Privacy Observant Location Service [POLS].
Similar-interests service: This service gathers data from nearby cellphone users and
notifies other cellphone users within the vicinity that have similar interests.
Coffee Shop, Restaurant, Cinema hall, Stadium seat availability: Another class of
applications known as opportunistic sensing application [Kapadia08] exploits the idea of
sharing contextual information among users in the form of periodic reports and thus
eliminates the necessity of mounting all the sensing equipment on every single device.
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The anonymized approach depicted in Hitchhiking [Tang06] is used to infer coffee shop
space availability. Without much extension, the idea can be used to find availability in
places like restaurants, cinema halls, and stadium seating. AnonySense [Kapadia08], the
architecture for opportunistic sensing of contexts, deploys a third party task server and
application server to blur the location information and performs aggregation of reports to
preserve privacy.
Shopping Mall Crowds Pattern: Similarly, the above approach can be used to identify
which shops are most popular, based on the presence of people.
Traffic Pattern Monitoring System: This service helps a driver to know the traffic pattern
of the route or zone to which he is headed. He can plan accordingly to reroute his travel,
depending on the congestion information provided. DashTM and TomTom® are examples
of traffic navigation systems where user locations are transmitted to servers, and the
routes with optimal distance and least traffic congestion are presented.
Market Model [Gunter04]: This is a type of service where a person can participate in an
anonymous survey providing personal information to help build market characteristics for
a group of users. The group may satisfy a certain time/space criterion. An example could
be the age pattern or average income of commuters at certain time periods at a station.
This service may serve the marketing needs of a company operating business in a specific
area.

2.4 Privacy

Westin’s definition of information Privacy states “Privacy is the claim of
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what
extent information is communicated to others” [Westin67]. The privacy violation in
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pervasive computing is thought to be the most contentious of the issues addressed so far.
With the multitude of information flowing around the environment, individual privacy is
now an easy prey for the eavesdropper, stalkers and adversaries. Researchers have made
continual efforts to define privacy that best suits the pervasive computing environment.
Palen and Dourish [Palen03] defined privacy in socio-technological terms for the
networked world and described it as the continuous balance of disclosure, identity and
temporal boundaries. Classical Design guidelines for Ubiquitous Systems by
Langheinrich [Langheinrich02] present six principles that are common in most legislative
systems. He describes the social implications of the ubiquitous system and claims that
the guidelines are readily implementable in the environment. Emphasis is on choice and
consent, pseudonymity, locality, and security measures which are basic design needs for
every ubiquitous computing application. To summarize the privacy implication of today’s
digitized world, we reiterate the famous quote of Ron Rivest: “What was once private is
now public”, “what was once hard to copy is now trivial to duplicate” and “what was
once easily forgotten, is now stored forever”. So, information transcends boundaries of
space and time.

2.5 Privacy issues in Location based Service
The LBS queries such as “find the nearest shopping mall” or “find the nearest
Italian restaurant” may seem innocuous, but once the identity of the individual making the
query is revealed, in the near future she might be bombarded with unsolicited
advertisements, newsletters, etc. So, in naïve terms, protecting privacy in LBS means in
some way hiding the exact location of the user making a query. As briefly discussed
earlier, the task of the Location Anonymizer is to obfuscate or cloak the location
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information of the query issuer with several other persons in the vicinity. For an
anonymity level k as requested by the query issuer, the LA will generalize the request (for
LBS) in such a way that it will contain the location information indistinguishable from k-1
other users. The principle is known as K-anonymity [Sweeney02] and has been introduced
for privacy protection of microdata such as census figures, medical information, and
voting registration. In LBS the concept can be adapted as: a K-anonymized query request
ensures that the CR chosen for a query offers the attacker a probability of re-identification
not exceeding 1/K, K being the preferred anonymity level (in short anon level) of a query
issuer. Details of the privacy protection mechanisms can be found in the Related Work
chapter. Listed here are some of the useful terms related to privacy protection in LBS used
throughout the thesis.

2.5.1 Service Provider
Service Providers (SP) are the entities that share or provide a requested
service/resource. In the case of LBS, the SP provides the result of LBQ to the Servicer
Requester. The LBS server is considered to be a non-trusted entity. The assumption is
that the commercial service can collect unauthorized information about individuals and
use it later for advertisement and marketing purposes. The communication channel
between the LBS and LA is not considered secure.

2.5.2 Service Requester
Service Requesters (SR) are devices that request a specific service/resource. As
discussed earlier, the devices are constrained with limited battery power and network
bandwidth. The Service Requester issues the query through a Location Anonymizer (LA)
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to ensure the user’s required level of privacy (level of anonymity). The LA obfuscates the
exact location of the request issuer and forwards the query to LBS.

2.5.3 Location Anonymizer
The Location Anonymizer (LA) is a trusted server, whose task is to collect the
current location information of the users (while making the query) and anonymize their
queries. Associated with each query is a required degree of anonymity k, which ranges
between 1 (no privacy requirements) and the user cardinality inside the anon set
(maximum privacy) [Kalnis07].

2.5.4 Cloaking Region
The location information forwarded by LA to LBS is termed as the Cloaking
Region (CR) or Anonymized Spatial Region (ASR). CR contains k users within it, k being
the desired anonymity level of the request issuer. The choice of the CR varies greatly
depending on different cloaking algorithms. The evaluation section provides a
comparative analysis of different cloaking algorithms including our approach.

2.5.5 Anonymity set
The anonymity set is defined as the list of users within the same CR. The location
represented by a CR is the same for all members of the anonymity set.

15

Chapter 3: The SafeGrid Location Privacy Framework

In this section, we introduce our location privacy framework, SafeGrid by providing a
brief overview. Our approach is based on grid structure. We are using a novel type of grid
structure which is simple and efficient. We have included an additional component for
performing the task of grid management. The Location Anonymizer (LA) included in our
framework is used based on user’s decision i.e. SafeGrid offers its subscribers the
alternatives of directly submitting query to LSP or going through an intermediate LA. In
SafeGrid, whether an LA is used or not, an initial grid is built. All users, location service
provider (LSP) and LA have knowledge of this grid. It is fundamental to understand the
design of the grid we will be using. So, here we are discussing the design issues related to
our proposed grid structure.

3.1 Grid Structure

We consider entire region of service to be composed of cellular units in the form of a
grid structure. The smallest unit of the grid is called a cell. For the sake of simplicity, a
cell is assumed to be a square-shaped geographical block. Each cell, denoted by a global
cell no ()ܦܫ_݈݈݁ܥ, has an area ( )݁ݖ݅ܵ_݈݈݁ܥwhich is set by fixing the length of one side of
the square shaped cell. We term this dimension as  ݏܴ݁݀݅ݎܩwhich is an important
parameter. A user’s location identity is represented by the cell he is in. A user is never
required to reveal his exact location rather he provides his cell identity. Hence, users may
directly contact an LSP to place his request or may go through a third-party Location
Anonymizer. Although it may seem unnecessary to have an LA, later we mention the
obvious advantages of using it. Thus we present a framework which has a Location
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Anonymizer as an optional component. Users are not obligated to get through an LA
though they have option to make use of it for gaining more privacy protection.

3.2 Grid Manager (GM)

We incorporate this auxiliary component for handling the management of location
grid. It has the relevant information like width and height of the area of concern. GM
considers lower left corner of that area as the point of origin of the grid (POG). Most
important part of grid design is to fix the size of its cells.  ݁ݖ݅ݏ_݈݈݁ܥis an important
parameter, as it has various impacts on the whole system. Primary level of anonymity and
quality of service at client side are directly related to this parameter. Choosing an optimal
value for  ݁ݖ݅ݏ_݈݈݁ܥis a difficult task. Moreover, its optimality also varies from user to
user because users with varying processing capability and diverse privacy requirements
may possess individual preference regarding cell-size. That’s why it is important to
consider all subscribed users’ preference while choosing a global cell-size for the entire
grid. In our proposed approach Grid Manager chooses  ݁ݖ݅ܵ_݈݈݁ܥaccording to the
following algorithm.
GRID-RESOLUTION-COMPUTE (U)
1.

N ← length[U]

2.

for i ← 1 to N

3.

do amin ← amin + U[i].min_a

4.

gmin ← gmin + U[i].min_g

5.

amin ← amin/N

6.

gmin ← gmin/N

7.

for i ← 1 to N

8.
9.

do δa += (U[i].min_a – amin) ^ 2
Amin ← ∞, A ← Nil
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10. for i ← 1 to N
11.
12.
13.

do if amin ≤ (U[i].min_a + 2δa)
then A ← U[i]
if U[i].min_a < Amin
then Amin ← U[i].min_a

14.

15. Gmin ← 0, G ← Nil
16. for i ← 1 to N
17.
18.
19.
20.

do if U[i].min_g ≤ Amin
then G ← U[i]
if U[i].min_g ≥ Gmin
then Gmin ← U[i].min_g

21. Cell_Res ← Gmin
22. return Cell_Res and TS

Each subscribed user has a couple of privacy preference parameters amin and gmin
which define minimum size of cloaked region and minimum cell size respectively. The
algorithm starts with each subscribed user sending these parameters to the GM. The for
loop of lines 2-4 combines the inputs from all the users. In order to eliminate feedbacks
from any possible malicious user, inputs that lie at extremities are excluded based on the
threshold value δa. The for loop of lines 10-14 computes the ultimate lower bound of
cloaked region, Amin after excluding the extreme values. Likewise, the lower bound of cell
size, Gmin is calculated in the for loop of lines 16-20. These filtered inputs are considered
to fix a  ݏܴ݁_݈݈݁ܥwhich meets every user’s ݃ requirements and ensures that it is
smaller than every user’s ܽ requirement. A user can compare the  ݏܴ݁_݈݈݁ܥreturned
by GM with his ܽ and ݃ parameter to verify any malicious attempt by GM. Due to
this, GM does not need to be a trusted entity as it can’t maliciously manipulate grid
resolution. GM performs this computation periodically with an interval of ߜ amount of
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time. At time  ݐGM computes grid resolution with the inputs received from the
subscribed users. It stores the time of this computation as TS along with the validity
period of this calculated grid resolution (i.e. )ݏܴ݁_݈݈݁ܥ.
3.3 SafeGrid: Without Location Anonymizer

Our preliminary system, which is built on the proposed grid structure, provides a
location privacy solution without any location anonymizer. Figure 3.1 depicts how a user
communicates with GM and LSP in such a system.

Figure 3.1. Primitive Framework (Without Location Anonymizer)

In the initialization phase, users send their privacy preference parameters like ܽ
and ݃ to the Grid Manager. Upon receiving data from all users GM fixes the grid
resolution using the algorithm discussed earlier. Then it informs users and LSP regarding
this change in grid resolution along with the duration of its validity. User submits his
location based queries directly to LSP using his knowledge of grid structure. Despite
sending his own location, user includes a set of k cells in his query. LSP responds with
the list of point of interests (POI) for all those k no of cells. Although query results are
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returned to the user for k no of cells, user considers only the ones related to his own cell
ignoring the rest. As this system eliminates location anonymizer, it provides a number of
obvious advantages. First, query processing time is reduced significantly. Second, user’s
exact location is never revealed to any third party. Finally, it eliminates the requirement
of secure communication channel between communicating entities. Taking these issues
into consideration this sort of location privacy framework seems suitable for pervasive
computing environment.
So far, we have explained our basic approach which is a naïve grid based system
without LA. Now we discuss that this solution is not enough for securing location privacy
and a third party LA is indeed required in such a framework. We continue our step by
step discussion towards our eventual SafeGrid framework which is reliable and efficient
in terms of privacy preservation and quality of service.

3.4 SafeGrid: Grid with Location Anonymizer

While making a location based query, a user’s location is obfuscated among at least ݇
cells, including his own cell. This approach does not guarantee that the generated
Anonymization Set (AS) [Gruteser03] contains at least ݇ no of users. In order to ensure
that user’s ݇-anonymity requirement is satisfied an LA is incorporated in our framework.
Below we present the architecture of the complete system including a location
anonymizer.
Now, we present our grid based location privacy framework, SafeGrid. Major
components of SafeGrid are GM and LA. A user provides his choice to GM. GM
constructs the grid for a certain period of time and sends grid parameters
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< ܱܲܩ, ݏܴ݁_݈݈݁ܥ, ߜ > to users, LBS and LA. From these parameters every party has
information about the entire grid and anyone can compute a ܦܫ_݈݈݁ܥ. This knowledge of
global  ܦܫ_݈݈݁ܥfor every party is basic to our approach. We discussed about the
characteristics of GM in Section II. The architecture of SafeGrid is illustrated in Figure
3.2.

Figure 3.2. Architecture of SafeGrid

Basic purpose of using a Location Anonymizer is to ensure that the query requester is
anonymous among at least (݇ − 1) other users. Users send periodic location update
information to the LA. With data from all users LA fills up its  ݈ܾ݁ܽܶ݀݅ݎܩwhich stores
the number of users in each cell and a parameter locked indicating the availability of the
cell in the form of a tuple <Cell_id, User Count, Locked>. Then Location Anonymizer
uses following algorithm to compute the cloaked region.
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BASIC-CR-CONSTRUCT (GT, U, uq, k)
1.

Sort GT in descending order of η

2.

CR ← U[q].c

3.

CR.count ← GT[q].η

4.

GT[q].locked ← True

5.

j←0

6.

while GT has more elements
do if CR.count ≥ k

7.

then return CR

8.

else j ← j + 1

9.
10.
11.

if GT[j].locked = False
then CR ← GT[j].c

12.

CR.count += GT[j].η

13.

GT[j].locked ← True

It takes input < ܶܩ, ܷ, ݑ , ݇ > from the user ݑ locating inside cell ݑ . ܿ . Here k
denotes the anonymity requirement of ݑ . The ultimate goal of the algorithm is to
construct a CR consisting of a number of cells including ݑ . ܿ so that the cumulative
number of users in those cells is at least k. U is the set of all users along with their current
cell location. The procedure initializes cloaked region with the cell of actual query
requester. The  ݈ܾ݁ܽܶ݀݅ݎܩmanaged by LA is sorted according to ܷݐ݊ݑܥ ݎ݁ݏ, ߟ in
descending order. Subsequent cells are taken from this sorted list and added to  ܴܥuntil
anonymity level of  ܴܥreaches ݇. LA uses this cloaked region ( )ܴܥas the location data
to formulate the final query which is sent to the LSP. In the following figures we
illustrate how cloaked region is constructed when user ݑଵ locating inside ܥଶଷ issues
query to LA with anonymity requirement of 10.
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(a) User Distribution inside Grid

(b) GridTable entries, C23 is selected and
added to CR

(c) Final state of GridTable

(d) CR for user u16; users in the AS are
marked as red

Figure 3.3. Steps of the BASIC-CR-CONSTRUCT algorithm

Figure 3.3(a) depicts a sample distribution of users in different grid cells. Subsequent
figures show the states of the GridTable maintained by the LA. Finally LA constructs
cloaked region for user ݑଵ including cells {ܥଶଶ , ܥଶଷ , ܥଷଶ } which ensures anonymity of
12. The cloaked region constructed in this way meets the anonymity requirement of the
query issuer. However, satisfying k-anonymity does not always guarantee full-proof
privacy safeguard. In the next section we present a couple of sophisticated privacy threats
which are applicable to most of the existing solutions.
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3.5 Location Privacy Attack

This approach, however, reveals some sensitive information to the LSP or any other
attacker. We assume that following information is available to the attacker [Ghinita07,
Kalnis07, Talukder10]: 1) Knowledge of cloaking algorithm; 2) The cloaked region; 3)
Anonymizing set and 4) Required anonymity level of query requester. If an attacker
continuously monitors these information over a period of time, he may infer a user’s
location. We illustrate a couple of such scenarios below.
Attack Scenario 1: In a grid based approach, CR actually returns a set of grid cells
ensuring that those cells contain at least ݇ no of users. Suppose, two such CRs are formed
where ܴܥଵ = {ܥଶଶ, ܥଶଷ , ܥଷଶ } ; ܵܣଵ = {ݑଵ , ݑଶ , ݑଷ , ݑସ , ݑହ ,  } ݑand ܴܥଶ = {ܥଶଶ, ܥଷଶ } ;
ܵܣଶ = {ݑଵ , ݑଶ , ݑଷ , ݑସ , ݑହ }. By gaining knowledge of such two CRs and correlating the
data a knowledgeable attacker can infer the cell location of user  ݑ. The scenario is
depicted in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4. Attack scenario 1 for grid based CR computation

All other standard cloaking techniques can be shown to fall under such attack. It can
be illustrated through Figure 3.5(a) (b).
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.5. Attack scenario 1

Figure 3.5(a) shows that a CR covers 6 users {ݑଵ , … , } ݑ. For instance, user u1 has
issued a query with anonymity requirement k = 5. The CR in the figure satisfies the
requirement. Later, when any other user with index 2 ≤ ݇ ≤ 6, issues a query with the
same anonymity level, the shrunk CR in Figure 3.5(b) is provided to the query processor.
According to the assumptions, the attacker may conclude that the last request issuer is the
user u1 and hence his location is at the right corner of the CR.
Attack Scenario 2: Let, a grid based approach constructs cloaking regions as ܴܥଵ =
{ܥଶଶ, ܥଶଷ , ܥଷଶ } ;

ܵܣଵ = {ݑଵ , ݑଶ , ݑଷ , ݑସ , ݑହ , } ݑ

and

ܴܥଶ = {ܥଵଷ, ܥଶଷ } ;

ܵܣଶ =

{ ݑ,  ݑ, } ଼ݑ. By correlating information gained from such two CRs an attacker can infer
the cell location of user  ݑ. Figure 3.6 illustrates this attack scenario.

Figure 3.6. Attack scenario 2 for grid based CR computation
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Identifying the common cell/cells in the cloaked regions of consecutive queries issued
by  ݑ, reveals her own cell, i.e. ܥଶଷ . An attacker can easily conceive such attempt to
break through the location privacy (in terms of cell location) of a user without his
awareness. Cloaking techniques in other standard location privacy frameworks are not
resistant against this attack as well. It can be best illustrated with Figure 3.7(a) (b).

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.7. Attack scenario 2

As evident from the figures, there exists two 3-CRs with two sets of users {ݑଵ , ݑଶ , ݑଷ }
and {ݑସ , ݑହ , } ݑ. When the user u6 leaves, the CRs are updated and new CR consisting of
the users {ݑସ , ݑହ } also includes u1. So, the user u1 is in the intersection of the two ASs
consisting of two sets of users {ݑଵ , ݑଶ , ݑଷ } and {ݑଵ , ݑସ , ݑହ }. Apparently, two subsequent
requests from these two groups of users will reveal the actual location of the user u1 to
the attacker.

3.6 Remedy

Attack scenario 1 can be handled if the users in the same set use same CR over the
time i.e. a cloaking algorithm that conforms to the reciprocity condition [Ghinita07,
Kalnis07, Talukder10]. The users in a CR always use the same CR until a rearrangement
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of the CR takes place due to arrival or departure of some user(s). Hilbert Cloaking
[Ghinita07, Kalnis07] is the one that meets such requirements but it performs poorly
when it comes to CR area optimization. Similarly to avoid Attack scenario 2 the users
can’t use overlapping ASs. The ASs should be defined for disjoint groups of user sets and
therefore conform to the reciprocity requirements. In following section we come up with
an approach which meets reciprocity condition. Prior to that, a detailed definition of
reciprocity condition is worthwhile.
Definition 1. The Reciprocity Condition

It is a condition for a cloaking technique where it is necessary that the LA generates
the same CR for every user in an anonymity set for the same anonymity level. Consider
that the LA generates a k-CR for the user u1 which also includes k-1 other
users {ݑଶ , … ݑ }. The reciprocity condition necessitates that if any other user apart from
u1, (i.e., a user having an index 1 < ݅ ≤ ݇) issues any request, the CR of the issuer must
be same as that of u1. A cloaking algorithm is said to satisfy the reciprocity condition if
the CR generated by the algorithm ensures that the set of users inside that CR will
generate the same CR. Although not considered as a necessary condition for any of the
cloaking techniques in the literature [Gruteser03, Gedik05, Mokbel06, Kalnis07], the
attacks demonstrated in this section emphasize the importance of this consideration. The
reciprocity condition has been addressed in Ghinita et al.’s work [Kalnis07] by proposing
a cloaking scheme (besides Nearest Neighborhood Cloaking - NNC) namely Hilbert
Cloaking which takes advantage of Hilbert space filling curve. Still, the technique suffers
from the attack and query quality problem, as discussed in the evaluation section. Finally,

27
we present our eventual solution designed to withstand the attack scenarios by
constructing cloaked regions that satisfy the reciprocity condition with little overhead.

3.7 Enhanced SafeGrid

To ensure that our CR construction algorithm meets reciprocity condition we have
made some changes to our basic approach. We partition entire user set into some groups
which we call Anonymity Group ( )݊݊ܣܩwhere all users with identical anonymity
requirement are placed in same ݊݊ܣܩ. Anonymity Sets (AS) are formed by taking at
least ݇ no of users from each ݊݊ܣܩ. Same AS and corresponding CR is used for each
member of this set. The CR construction algorithm consists of the following steps.
Step 1. Partition  ݈ܾ݁ܽܶ݀݅ݎܩbased on distinct values of ݇ to construct Anonymity Groups
݊݊ܣܩଵ , ݊݊ܣܩଶ , … , ݊݊ܣܩே where ݊݊ܣܩଵ consists of all users with maximum ݇
requirement and ݊݊ܣܩே consists of all users with minimum ݇ requirement. ߟ denotes
the common ݇ required by all users of ݊݊ܣܩ .
Step 2. For each Anonymity Group Compute the distinct cells in that group.
Step 3. Select successive unassigned cells from ݊݊ܣܩଵ until cumulative no of users in
the selected cells reaches ߟଵ . If cumulative no of users in all unassigned cells of ݊݊ܣܩ
can’t meet ߟ , continue selecting unassigned cells from higher indexed ( ݊݊ܣܩi.e.
݊݊ܣܩାଵ ).
Step 4. Mark all these selected cells in all Anonymity Groups as “assigned”.
Step 5. Construct a CR with these cells.
Step 6. Update  ݈ܾ݁ܽܶ݀݅ݎܩby assigning this CR to each user of the cells in the CR.
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Step 7. Repeat Steps 3-6 for ݊݊ܣܩଵ , ݊݊ܣܩଶ, …, ݊݊ܣܩே until every cell is assigned
into some CR.
Details of the tasks accomplished in each of the above mentioned steps are shown in the
following procedure.
SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT (GT)
1.

Sort GT in descending order of k

2.

j←1, Anon ← GA[j].k

3.

for i←1 to N

4.

do if GT[i].k = Anon

5.

then GA[j] ← GT[i]

6.

else j++

7.

GA[j].k ← GT[i].k

8.

Anon ← GA[j].k

9.
10.
11.

for j←1 to n
do for k ← 1 to length[GA[j]]
do if GA[j][k].c not in GA[j].cell
then GA[j].cell ← GA[j].[k].c

12.

13. while Cell has more elements
14.

do Cell[c].locked ← False

15. CR ← Nil, i ← 1
16. for j ← 1 to n
17.
18.

do Anon ← GA[j].k
while CR[i].count < Anon

19.
20.

do while GA[j] has more elements
do x ← GA[j][q].c

21.

if x.locked = False

22.

then CR[i] ← x

23.

CR[i].count += x.count

24.

x.locked ← True

25. return CR
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The procedure takes the Grid Table, GT as input. Each entry of GT stores the current
cell and anonymity requirement of each user as the values of GT[i].c and GT[i].k
respectively. GA[p] is the pth anonymity group consisting of users having same
anonymity requirement denoted by GA[p].k. The two for loops of lines 3-12 partition the
GT into a finite number of GA’s along with computing the user count per cell.
Then in lines 13-14 each cell is initialized as unassigned/unlocked. The variable Cell
holds a complete list of all those cells along with their availability information. The
actual task of cloaked region construction occurs inside the for loop of lines 16-24. It
picks unlocked cells from subsequent GA’s and puts them into a CR until the maximum
requirement as denoted by CR[i].count is reached. Finally, the set of cloaked regions, CR
is returned.

3.7.1 Illustrative Example

An illustrative example demonstrates, in detail, actually how an AS and the
corresponding CR are constructed by the SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT procedure. Figure
3.8 and 3.9 show a sample user distribution and the resultant initial state of GT.

Figure 3.8. User Distribution in Location Grid

Figure 3.9. Initial GridTable
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Figure 3.10 shows the changes of GT after each major step of the algorithm. Step 1
and Step 2 illustrates the process of partitioning GT into different GAnon’s. Then the
iterations of the CR construcion step is divided into sequential substeps. They exhibit the
allocation of unlocked cells into subsequent CR’s.

GAnon1
(k = 4)
GAnon2
(k = 3)
GAnon1
(k = 4)
GAnon2
(k = 3)

GAnon1
(k = 4)
GAnon2
(k = 3)

GAnon1
(k = 4)
GAnon2
(k = 3)

Step 1:
<u2, C41>, <u4, C43>, <u6, C43>,<u8,C42>,
<u10, C23>, <u12, C23>, <u14, C32>
<u1, C41>, <u3, C42>, <u5, C12>,<u7,C33>,
<u9, C32>, <u11, C23>, <u13,C33>,<u15,C12>
C23
(3)
C23
(3)

Step 2:
C33
C41
(2)
(2)
C32
C12
(2)
(2)

C42
(2)
C41
(2)

C43
(2)
C42
(2)

C23
(3)
C23
(3)

Step 3.1:
CR1: [C23, C33]
C41
C42
C33
(2)
(2)
(2)
C32
C12
C41
(2)
(2)
(2)

C43
(2)
C42
(2)

Step 3.2:
CR1: [C23, C33]; CR2: [C41, C42]
C43
C23
C33
C41
C42
(3)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
C23
C32
C12
C41
C42
(3)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)

Step 3.3:
CR1: [C23, C33]; CR2: [C41, C42]; CR3: [C43, C32, C12]
GAnon1
C23
C33
C41
C42
C43
(k = 4)
(3)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
GAnon2
C23
C32
C12
C41
C42
(k = 3)
(3)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
Figure 3.10. Steps of CR Construction

Finally, the constructed anonymity sets and cloaked regions are shown in Figure 3.11.
From Figure 3.11(b) it is evident that each user experiences greater level of anonymity
than their requested ones.
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Cloaked Region

Anonymization Set

Achieved Anon.

CR1: [C23, C33]

AS1: [u10, u11, u12, u13, u14]

5

CR2: [C41, C42]

AS2: [u1, u2, u3, u8]

4

CR3: [C43, C32, C12]

AS3: [u4, u5, u6, u7, u9, u15]

6

(a) Constructed CRs and corresponding disjoint ASs

User

u1

u2

u3

u4

u5

u6

u7

…

u15

k (reqd.)

3

4

3

4

2

4

3

…

3

Cell

C41 C41 C42 C43

C12

C43 C43

…

C12

CR
CR2 CR2 CR2 CR3 CR3
k (achd.) 4
4
4
6
6

CR3 CR3
6
6

…
…

CR3
6

(b) Updated GridTable stored by the LA
Figure 3.11 Final Outcome of SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT

However, this illustrative example does not hold sufficient proof to our claim of
satisfying the reciprocity condition. A theoretical proof on that follows next.

3.7.2 Resolving Trade-off between privacy and QOS

After constructing the CR Location Anonymizer modifies the actual query by
replacing the  ܦܫ_݈݈݁ܥof actual requester with the set of cells belonging to the CR. At this
point, LSP receives the  ݐݏ݅ܮ_݈݈݁ܥalong with the proximity query. It then returns the
candidate list consisting of possible query results to the LA. Query results are eventually
returned to the actual query issuer in a special tabular format which includes the ܦܫ_݈݈݁ܥ
of each POI. Upon receiving the list of possible candidates user finds the closest one. A
noteworthy feature of SafeGrid is that computation overhead in client side remains almost
same with increasing value of ݇. In order to facilitate this we make use of efficient data
structure and smart techniques of message passing which are shown below.
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ܲܦܫ_݀ݑ݁ݏ

ܳݕݎ݁ݑ

)ݐݏ݅ܮ_݈݈݁ܥ( ܴܥ

(a) Request Message Format

ܦܫ_݈݈݁ܥ

ܳܦܫ_݈݈݁ܥ ݎ݂ ݏ݁ݐܽ݀݅݀݊ܽܥ ݕݎ݁ݑ
(b) Response Message Format

ܥଵଵ ݍଵ , ݍଶ … ܥ ݍ , ݍାଵ … ܥ ݍ , ݍାଵ
(c) Response Message Data Structure
Figure 3.12 Message Formats and Data Structure

Query results are returned to the user according to the above mentioned format.
Depending on value of k size of this transferred data may grow or shrink. But the
important point to note that user is concerned only about the query results lying in his
own cell, say  , and ignores all other results. Thus a user’s actual query processing time
depends on the size of his own cell size disregarding the size of CR generated by the LA.
So, processing time at client side is unaffected by his anonymity requirement. This is an
indication that SafeGrid greatly reduces the trade-off between privacy and user side QOS.

3.7.3 Proof of Attack Resistance

In order to prove the capability of our proposed approach to resist the attacks
mentioned in this paper, we show that the cloaked region construction algorithm meets
reciprocity condition.
Theorem: SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT meets the reciprocity condition.
Proof: ݑ submits a query and the following cloaked region is constructed.
ݑ(ܴܥ ) = ڂୀଵ ܿ where ݇ ≤ ݊, n is total no. of cells
ݑ(ܵܣ ) = ڂୀଵ ݑ where ݇ is requested anonymity.
Let, ݑ ∈ ݑ(ܵܣ ) then, ݑ . ܿ ∈ ݑ(ܴܥ )
We prove that, ݑ(ܴܥ ) ⊆ ݑ( ܴܥ )
Suppose, ܿ௫ ∈ ݑ(ܴܥ )

…

(1)
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Now, since ݑ ∈ ݑ(ܵܣ )
⟹ ݑ . ݇ = ݑ . ݇ … (2) [Acc. to CR constr. algorithm]
Then, (ݑ ∈ ܣܩ ) ⟹ (ݑ ∈ ܣܩ ) [Defn. of GA]
௨ .


where the pth anonymity group, ܣܩ = ڂ௬ୀଵ
ݑ௬

ݑ(ܴܥ ) = {∪ ܿ | ∀ܿ ݅∃ ݕ = ݑ௬ . ܿ}
Now, ∀ܿ௫ ∈ ݑ(ܴܥ ) ∀ݑ ∈ ܿ௫ ݑ . ݇ = ݑ . ݇
Let, ܿ௫ = ݑ . ܿ and ݑ . ݇ = ݑ . ݇ = ߣ
According to Eqn. (2) ݑ . ݇ = ݑ . ݇
⟹ ݑ(ܵܣ ) = ݑ(ܵܣ )
⟹ ݑ ∈ ݑ(ܵܣ )
⟹ ܿ௫ ∈ ݑ(ܴܥ )
⟹ ܿ௫ ∈ ݑ(ܴܥ ) … (3)
[∀ݑ ∈ ܵܣ൫ݑ ൯ ܿ௫ ݑ(ܴܥ ) ⟹ ܿ௫ ∈ ݑ(ܴܥ )]
Hence, from eqn. (1) and eqn. (3) we obtain,
∀ܿ ݔ௫ ∈ ݑ(ܴܥ ) ⟹ ܿ௫ ∈ ݑ(ܴܥ )
⟹ ݑ(ܴܥ ) ⊆ ݑ(ܴܥ ) …

(4)

It can be shown that (4) is true for any other user lying inside the cloaked region of
ݑ . So, any other user with same anonymity requirement as ݑ yields cloaked region
which does not contain any cell that is not inside the cloaked region of ݑ . Thus,
SafeGrid-CR-CONSTRUCT meets the reciprocity condition. ◊
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Chapter 4: Identity Inference Protection

Our proposed location privacy framework, SafeGrid enhances the attack resistance
capability. It ensures privacy of location information against a wide variety of attacks
including the novel ones introduced in this thesis. The major feature of satisfying the
reciprocity condition makes it superior to the existing CR-based approaches. However,
the ultimate goal of preserving privacy lies in preventing unintentional inference of the
identity of actual query issuer. In this regard, our basic system, along with all the other
ones found in current literature, fail to provide a full-proof solution, atleast in the sense
that under some situations the disclosure of the identity of the user may be highly likely.
In this chapter, we focus on such more advanced dimension of privacy protection which
deals with identity revelation threats stemming from location based inferences. First, we
show how the current measure of k-anonymity is not an adequate one considering its
vulnerability to several new attacks. Afterwards, we present the definition of a new
measure, called s-proximity. Finally, we propose slight modifications to the earlier
proposed framework mostly in terms of augmenting more capabilities and functionalities
on the part of the trusted third party. In addition, several innovative algorithms are
formulated to assimilate the proposed privacy measure into the cloaking algorithm being
used.

4.1 Identity Inference Attacks

In this section, we exhibit that the conventional measure, k-anonymity does not
provide sufficient protection against privacy violation. Two attacks called, the
heterogeneity attack and the conformity attack, are presented and it is demonstrated how
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they can be used to compromise a k-anonymous location based query. The heterogeneity
attack reveals that k-anonymity can create groups that fail to provide overall anonymity
due to lack of sufficient match among the members with respect to some sensitive user
attribute. Likewise, approaches satisfying only k-anonymity disregard consequences of
revealing important context [Talukder08] information though the service request and
pave the way for conformity attack. Besides illustrating the attacks with real world
examples, the section provides their formal definitions which clarify how they relate to
the contexts [Talukder08] of the query and static information [Machanavajjhala06] of the
users in the anonymity set (AS) [Machanavajjhala06].

4.1.1 Example Scenarios

Let’s take a look at some real world examples of location based services to better
understand the threat of privacy violation. The examples demonstrate that existing
solutions which depend on satisfying k-anonymity are still vulnerable to privacy violation
attacks.
We assume Alice is currently subscribed to a location based system which uses a
trusted LA to make her location k-anonymous and forward her query to the LSP. Alice is
guaranteed that her exact location is never disclosed to the LSP by assuring that she
remains k-anonymous to the unknown third-party where k is chosen by herself according
to her required privacy level. However, we present couple of random scenarios where her
ultimate privacy is shown to be endangered although her location is k-anonymous to the
LSP.
Scenario 1: Alice, owing to some chronic disease, goes through regular medical
checkup. She moves to a new place and looks for the nearest medical center. Due to the
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specific nature of her illness she is considering only healthcare centers that treat feminine
diseases. This makes it logical for her to query for the nearest female hospital from her
current location. She submits her query regarding locating the nearest female hospital to
the LSP. The LBS system that handles her request provides her with the requested service
along with preserving her location privacy by means of ensuring that her location
information is made k-anonymous before being submitted to any un-trusted party (in this
case, LSP).
Scenario 2: Here Alice uses the LBS system for her academic purpose. As she
starts her new semester in the graduate school, after the first week of classes she is given
a list of books some of which she needs to purchase urgently. She searches for the nearest
bookstores from her residence and is served by the LBS system. The LBS system takes
her location and returns her the list of book stores located nearest to her place.
Scenario 3: Alice makes frequent travels to new places where she faces the
problem of finding nearest car parks. She is reluctant to disclose all the places she visits
due to privacy concern. Hence she gets her privacy-aware LBS system involved into the
task of finding nearest car parks. She feels comfortable because she gets the service
without disclosing either her identity or location data.
In the above scenarios Alice has to provide her location to get the services but due to
threat of identity disclosure she is reluctant to provide her exact location, rather the LA
creates a CR and forwards her query to the LSP. If Alice has, for example, k=4
anonymity requirement, the LA makes sure that instead of her location a CR that contains
at least 3 other users is sent to the LSP. Thus the LBS system tries to protect her location
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privacy and finally preserve any un-solicited identity disclosure. Still her identity can be
disclosed to the LSP as discussed below.

4.1.2 Attacks on k-Anonymity

We assume that the LSP or any other adversary has access to the following
information [Kalnis07].
1) Accesses requested anonymity level (i.e. value of k) for each query.
2) Recognizes the users belonging to the AS corresponding to the CR of a query.
3) Collects static profile data of all the users that have made query at some time.
4) Identifies any special context revealed by the query and maps that context to relevant
user attribute.
Finally it is supposed that a group of malicious LSPs collaborate with each other by
sharing their knowledge about the users in an effort to re-identify any individual query
requester. Based on the above assumptions we summarize the knowledge of the LSPs
involved in the LBS system in the following table.
TABLE 4.1 IDENTITY INFERENCE ATTEMPT FROM BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
Criteria
Query

 ܗܑܚ܉ܖ܍܋܁
Nearest Female
Hospital

 ܗܑܚ܉ܖ܍܋܁
Nearest Book Store

 ܗܑܚ܉ܖ܍܋܁
Nearest Car Park

LSP
|AS| (value of k)
Members of AS (LSP has
identified)
Context of the service
Relevant user attribute
Findings

LSPଵ
4
{Alice, Bob,
William, Ada}
Healthcare
Gender
Only Alice is female
in the group

LSPଶ
4
{Alice, Carl, Jacob,
Michael}
Academic
Occupation
Only Alice is student
in the group

LSPଷ
4
{Alice, Bob, Daniel,
Joshua}
Transportation
Driving License
Only {Alice, Joshua}
have Driving License

Identity Inference
(probable query requester)

Alice

Alice

{Alice, Joshua}
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In Scenario 1 the attacker (in this case LSPଵ ) successfully identifies Alice to be the
query issuer. The fact that she was grouped with 3 male users who seem unlikely to
request for a female hospital enabled the re-identification. Her query was too specific as
well. In Scenario 2 the attacker succeeds again. Here Alice is grouped with non academic
users which made the attacker guess Alice to be the query requester. In Scenario 3 the
attacker was able to narrow down the list of possible issuers. From the context of the
service being requested the attacker knows that any user not having driving license is
unlikely to request for a car park. There might be numerous occasions such as discussed
above where k-anonymity fails to guard against identity disclosure. We have classified all
these into two categories which are discussed below.

4.1.3 Classification of Attacks

1) Heterogeneity Attack: The members in the anonymity set are too much diversified
with respect to some static attributes. In worst case, the query requester might possess
some exclusive identifiable property, then she no longer remains indistinguishable. For
example, an AS which groups a female user with all male users is vulnerable to such
attack.
Observation: The anonymity set should ensure the inclusion of a minimum number of
users with similar profile as the actual query requester with respect to some static
attributes.
2) Conformity Attack: The service being requested in the query is too specialized as it
relates to some particular contexts. A user has to conform to some specific conditions to
be a potential candidate for such service. If most of the users in the AS fail to possess
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those properties, chances of the actual requester being re-identified increase. For
example, a query for a nearest female hospital is too specific. Instead the request for a
nearest hospital involves fewer contexts [Talukder08, Machanavajjhala06].
Observation: The query is made more generalized by changing granularity level
[Machanavajjhala06] of the intended service.
Both of these two types of attacks have some common properties as they relate to the
context of the query and the static attribute of the requester. To better understand the
notion of this novel attack we define it formally in the following section.

4.2 Attack Model

Now we move into the formalization of the attacks. However, prior to that a walk
through the notations and definitions will be worthwhile.

4.2.1 Definitions

User Set (U): The LA maintains a list of users who have subscribed to it. This list is
denoted by ܷ = {ݑଵ , ݑଶ , … , ݑே } where ݑ represents ith user.
Context (C): Any sensed information used to describe some physical phenomena is
defined as context [Talukder08]. In this paper we mean by context any deterministic
condition or situation that characterizes a service. The contexts can take on different
levels of granular values. A finite domain of information for all the contexts in the
application is assumed in our proposed model. Thus, the individual sets of contexts will
have a finite number of possible values. Using higher level granular values the service
becomes more generalized.
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Service (S): We consider, the set ܵ = {ݏଵ , ݏଶ , … , ݏ } consists of location based services
only. A user has to provide some sort of location data to avail such services. Although
location is the major emphasized context for these services, other contexts are also
associated with each service. Generally each service is provided by an LSP whereas it is
common for an LSP to deliver a group of services.
Static Information (SI): The static information could be the user’s static attributes or
credentials used to authenticate his identity. We refer to the set of static information as
ܵ݅ݏ{ = ܫଵ , ݅ݏଶ , … , ݅ݏ }. We use the terms static information, static user attribute and
static user profile interchangeably throughout the paper. In some places we have used SI
= {ܽଵ , ܽଶ , ܽଷ , … , ܽ } where ܽ stands for ith static user attribute. Values of these
attributes specify individual query requesters. A subset of SI forms quasi identifier
[Machanavajjhala06, Cuellar02]. The static information is not directly provided by the
requester of a location based query rather an attacker collects it from background data
sources.
Anonymity Set (AS): The list of probable issuers of a query request is called an
anonymity set. The request can be issued by any candidate in the anonymity set. The reidentification process becomes more difficult as the cardinality of the set increases

4.2.2 Formal Definition of the Attack

The attacker is supposed to possess following knowledge [Mokbel06, Talukder08,
Ghinita07].
1. Query Request, ݎ: (ݏ, ܿ,  )݅ݏwhere
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ܵ ∈ ݏ: service being requested; ܿ ⊆ ܥ: contexts of the service; ܫܵ ⊆ ݅ݏ: relevant static
user attributes corresponding to the contexts of the service
2. Cloaked Region, ݔ({ = ܴܥ, ݔ|)ݕ, ܴܥ(ٿ ܴ ∈ ݕ. ݓଵ ≤ ܴܥ ≤ ݔ. ݓଶ ) ܴܥ(ٿ. ℎଵ ≤ ≤ ݕ
ܴܥ. ℎଶ )}
3. Requested Anonymity level, ݇
4. The knowledge of  ܴܥand ݇ together suffice to know about the anonymity set.
Anonymity Set, ݑ{ = ܵܣଵ , ݑଶ , … , ݑ }, where ݑ ∈ ܷ ∀݅
Now, we suppose the following:
ݏ . ܿ(ݒ ): Value of the context ܿ of service ݏ
ݑ . ܿ[݅ݏ(ݒ ]): Value of the static user attribute corresponding to context ܿ of user ݑ
Based on the above assumptions we formally define the attack model below.
Suppose, ݑ submits query ݏ( = ݎ, ܿ,  )݅ݏto the LSP with cloaked region formed by
ݑ{ = ܵܣଵ , ݑଶ , … , ݑ } to meet her k-anonymity requirement.
We assume that, ݑ is distinctive from every other user in  ܵܣwith respect to any static
user attribute corresponding to some context of the service being requested.i.e., ∃ܿ ∈
ܿ|ݑ . ܿ[ ݅ݏ(ݒ ]) ≠ ݑ . ܿ[ ݅ݏ(ݒ ]), ∀݆ ≠ ( … ݎ1)
Now, the LSP being a malicious attacker finds out some context ܿ relevant to query ݎ
and ݅ݏ be a static user attribute corresponding to ܿ . Then it looks up in background data
sources to collect data of ݅ݏ attribute for all ݑ ∈ ܵܣ. Since ݑ is the actual query
requester, ݑ . ܿ[݅ݏ( ݒ ]) = ݏ. ܿ(ݒ ) … (2) holds true.
According to Assumption (1):
∃݆|ݑ . ܿ[݅ݏ( ݒ ]) ≠ ݑ . ܿ[ ݅ݏ(ݒ ]), ݆ ≠ ( … ݎ3).
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The attacker can exclude from the  ܵܣthe users that satisfy eqn. (3). As the size of ܵܣ
shrinks, the probability of re-identifying ݑ increases. Collaboration among a group of
malicious LSPs may yield a context ܿ௫ for which eqn. (2) may hold for every ݑ ∈ ܵܣ
except ݑ . Then ݑ could be immediately re-identified as the query issuer.◊
As we have already defined the identity inference attack in a formal way, we proceed
to introduce our

approach to handle it. At the core of our solution there exists a new

privacy parameter called s-proximity which we introduce next.

4.3 s-Proximity: A New Privacy Parameter

A close look at the attack scenarios reveals that if actual query requester is fully
distinguishable from other users in the AS, with respect to some static attribute relevant
to the context of the query, her identity may be disclosed immediately whatever her
achieved location anonymity may be. Therefore, it is highly desirable that at least a
minimum number of users in the AS have similar profile as the actual query issuer. This
requirement adds a novel parameter, called s-proximity, to the users’ privacy profile
[Li07]. Before defining s-proximity, we need to introduce couple of relevant definitions.
Dissimilarity Measure: This metric measures the amount of divergence between two
users with respect to a certain static user attribute. We use the notation ݀௦  (ݑ , ݑ ) to
denote the dissimilarity measure between ݑ and ݑ based on ݅ݏ where ݅ݏ is a static
attribute corresponding to the context ܿ of service ݏ . ݀௦  (ݑ , ݑ ) < ߜ ⇒ ݑ ~ ݑ [ݑ
is “similar to” ݑ ], ߜ is a user defined threshold value.
Equivalence Class (E): The set of users that are similar to ݑ with respect to pth static
attribute ݅ݏ is called equivalence class of ݑ and denoted by ܧ௦  (ݑ ).
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ܧ௦  (ݑ ) = ൛ݑ ∈ ܷห൫ݑ ~ݑ ൯ ∧ ൫݅ݏ = ݅ݏ ൯ൟ
= {ݑ ∈ ܷ|݀௦  ൫ݑ , ݑ ൯ < ߜ}
Divergence Class (D): The set of users that are not similar to ݑ with respect to pth static
attribute ݅ݏ is called divergence class of ݑ and denoted by ܦ௦  (ݑ ).
ܦ௦  (ݑ ) = ൛ݑ ∈ ܷห൫ݑ ≁ ݑ ൯ ∧ ൫݅ݏ = ݅ݏ ൯ൟ
= {ݑ ∈ ܷ|݀௦  ൫ݑ , ݑ ൯ ≥ ߜ}
s-Proximity: By s-proximity we mean that the AS will contain at least (s-1) other users
similar to the actual query requester ݑ , i.e., |ܧ ∩ ܵܣ௦  (ݑ )| ≥ ݏ.
Selecting higher value of s guarantees strong privacy but at the cost of degraded quality
of service. So, users themselves are responsible for choosing value of s according to their
preference.
Enhanced Privacy Profile (, ,  ): With the introduction of s-proximity our model
assumes that a user’s privacy profile consists of ݇,  ݏand ܣ which stand for anonymity
requirement, proximity requirement and minimum CR area constraint.

4.4 Context-Aware Location Anonymizer

We start our discussion with the generalized view of a location privacy framework
having a trusted location anonymizer (LA). In such systems subscribed users send their
location based query to the LA which replaces the exact location with a cloaked region
and forwards the query to the LSP. In reply LSP returns the list of query results which is
usually termed as list of point of interests (POI) to the LA and eventually the POI list is
forwarded to the query requester. The system is depicted in the figure below.

44

Figure 4.1. The Location query processing through LA

Such a system tries to preserve user’s location privacy by implementing the measure
of k-anonymity. As long as a system ensures that user’s location is k-anonymous to the
LSP, it apparently succeeds in preserving location privacy. In this paper we have shown,
this typical notion of safeguarding location privacy by means of k-anonymity is not
adequate rather it may endanger a user’s ultimate privacy by revealing her sensitive
private data. To provide a robust privacy solution we need to ensure both k-anonymity
and s-proximity. We use this existing privacy framework and incorporate advanced
functionalities into the LA to provide such a solution.

4.4.1 Overview of the System

We propose a location privacy system with a trusted LA which creates anonymization
group considering context of the query. At the core of our approach lies an enhanced
location anonymizer attributed with multiple capabilities and we call it a Context Aware
Location Anonymizer (c-LA). As the basic functionality is same we use the terms LA and
c-LA interchangeably hereinafter. The main focus of the solution is on minimizing the
probability of re-identifying the actual query requester along with anonymizing his
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location information. A location based query usually contains other sensitive information
alongside spatial data. Hence, it is not enough to hide only the location data rather we
propose modifying the query as a whole to minimize any identifying information it
carries. We term this process Query Generalization which is the first step of our solution.
The task is accomplished at the LA by an additional module called Query Analyzer which
identifies any sensitive context in the query and looks for possible generalization. Only
generalizing the query does not solve all the problems. As we discussed earlier the way
users are grouped together to form anonymization set impacts the possibility of reidentifying actual query issuer. The task of satisfying the s-proximity condition is
performed by the module called Partitioning Agent responsible for splitting the entire
user set into Equivalence Class and Divergence Class. Finally, the CR Construction Unit
generates the cloaked region based on anonymization set created from users in the
Equivalence Class.

Figure 4.2. Architecture of Context Aware Location Anonymizer (c-LA)
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4.4.2 Details of Our Solution

The Context Aware Location Anonymizer, as depicted in Figure 4.2, consists of
multiple units, each unit performing dedicated tasks. The overall process of
anonymization is accomplished in several steps which are discussed below in detail.
Step 1. Initialization: Location Anonymizer maintains a list of services for which it has
registered with corresponding LSPs. For each service, LA has knowledge of relevant
contexts using which it generates a set of static information interrelated with the service.
LA stores all these information in the Service Attribute Mapping (SAM) table which has
the form: < ܵ݁݁ܿ݅ݒݎ, ݐݏ݅ܮ_ݐݔ݁ݐ݊ܥ, ܵ> ݐݏ݅ܮ_݊݅ݐܽ݉ݎ݂݊ܫ_ܿ݅ݐܽݐ
The LA informs its subscribed users about its SAM table. A user chooses the services
of his interest and finds the set of required static information. The user then registers with
the LA providing that static information.

Figure 4.3. Initialization Phase

At the time of registration the user also notifies the LA about his privacy profile. The
user does that in Step 2 in the above figure by passing the values of < ݇, ݏ, > ݊݅݉ܣ
denoted by ݂ݎ_ݒ݅ݎ. In the same message the user includes his personal information in
 ݂ݎ_ݎ݁and his preferred services list in ݐݏ݈݅_݂݁ݎ_ݒݎ݁ݏ. At the end of this phase the
LA gets necessary information from the subscribed users to fill in the User Profile table.
Structure of this table is: < ܷݎ݁ݏ, ݐݏ݈݅_݂݁ݎ_ݒݎ݁ݏ, ݂ݎ_ݎ݁, > ݂ݎ_ݒ݅ݎ
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Step 2. Query Generalization: In this step the LA tries to generalize the query by
modifying the content of the request. In effect, it modifies the granularity level of the
requested service. To facilitate that all the services are arranged in a hierarchical tree
structure where a node represents the generalized service for all the services in the subtree rooted at that node. The contexts related to the services are used to determine the
correlations among them and to construct the tree. This step may be termed as the Service
Generalization step as well. The main task of service generalization is accomplished by
using a generalization function. In order to better understand how the generalization
function works we intend to define the query request in a formal way as follows.
A query request consists of the identity of the user, the context and the static
information and it has a complex domain: ܴ ∈ {ܷ × Π ܥ × Π୨ ܵ }. The context and
static information contained in this request are modified by the generalization function,
ܩ௦ to yield a generalized request. The generalized request domain can be represented as:
ܴ′ ∈ {ܷ ′ × Π୧ ܥᇱ × Π୨ ܵ′ } which contains the context and static information augmented to
higher granularity levels. We have identified the following properties [Talukder08] which
the generalization function ܩ௦ : ܴ → ܴ′ holds.
1. Many to one mapping: Two or more requests can be transformed into same
augmented request that is forwarded to the service provider. ∃ݎଵ , ݎଶ ∈ ܴ, ܩ௦ (ݎଵ ) =
ܩ௦ (ݎଶ ) =  ݎ′ , ݎଵ ≠ ݎଶ
2. Idempotent with generalized request: If the generalization function is applied to a
generalized request, no more generalization will be possible, provided the generalization
criteria

along

with

anonymity

and

∀ܴ ∈ ݎ, ܩ௦ ൫ܩ௦ ()ݎ൯ = ܩ௦ ()ݎ, ݊ = 1, 2, …

proximity

levels

remain

the

same.
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3. Invertible: The generalization function also has an inverse function. ∀∈ ݎ
ܴ, ∃ݎଵ : ܩ௦ିଵ (ݎ = )ݎଵ , ܩ௦ିଵ : ܴᇱ → ܴ , ݊ ≥ 1. When ݊ = 1, the issuer of the request is reidentified hence, the inverse generalization function can be used in simulating inference
attacks.
4. Asymmetric: The generalization function and its inverse are asymmetric in nature.
∀ܩ ∶ ܴ ∈ ݎ௦ିଵ ൫ܩ௦ ()ݎ൯ ≠ ݎ, where ܩ௦ିଵ : ܴᇱ → ܴ , ݊ ≥ 1
5. Non injective: The generalization function is non injective in nature. If two or more
requests are generalized using the same augmented request it doesn’t imply that the
requests are the same. ∀ݎଵ , ݎଶ ∈ ܴ: ܩ௦ (ݎଵ ) = ܩ௦ (ݎଶ ) ⇏ ݎଵ = ݎଶ
6. Non Equivalence of function: The generalization functions having different privacy
preferences may provide the same generalization for two or more requests. ∀∈ ݎ
ܴ: ܩ௦ଵ (ܩ = )ݎ௦ଶ (ܩ ⇏ )ݎ௦ଵ ≅ ܩ௦ଶ . Although some of the requests achieve same
generalizations,  ܩmay not be equivalent due to the fact that all of the context or static
values are not assigned, or the granularity level is coarse enough so that the
generalization was not applied even.
Step 3. Proximity Group Formation: The user submits his location based query along
with her privacy preference parameters (݇, ݏ, ܣ ) to the LA. In our proposed model
user has option to send a set of additional parameters which set the priorities of the static
information variables involved with the service being requested. Based on these inputs
the LA partitions the entire user set into two disjoint subsets: Equivalence Class and
Divergence Class according to the following algorithm.
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Algorithm: Proximity Group Formation
Input: query ܴ ∈ ݎ: < ݏ, ܿ, > ݅ݏ, weight matrix ݓ
1. Sort  ݅ݏin descending order of ݓ
2. for (݅ = 1  )݇ ݐdo
3.
4.

for (݆ = 1  )ܰ ݐdo
if (݀(ܷ[݆]. ] ݅[ ݅ݏ, ܷ[]ݎ.  )ߜ ≤ )] ݅[݅ݏthen
Insert ܷ[݆] into ܧ

5. for (݆ = 1  )ܰ ݐdo
6.

if (ܷ[݆] ∉  ) ܧthen
Insert ܷ [݆] into ܦ

7. return ܧ, ܦ
The algorithm takes the query, r and weight matrix, w as input. w contains user’s
preferred priority of the involved static attributes. Based on that priority other users are
compared with the query requester. The users that are similar to query requester are
inserted into equivalence class, E and others are inserted into divergence class, D.
Step 4. Cloaked Region Generation: In this step the LA constructs the cloaked region
which is forwarded to the LSP. First, it chooses the AS in such a way so that it meets
both k-anonymity and s-proximity. Then using the locations of the members of AS the
CR is constructed which meets the ܣ requirement. The CR generation process follows
the algorithm presented below.
Algorithm: Selective Nearest Neighbor (SNN) Cloak
Input: ܷ, ܧ, ݇, ݏ, ܣ , ܮ
Initialization: }{ = ܵܣ, ݅ = 0
1. Sort users in ܷ in ascending order of dissimilarity from ܷ[]ݎ
2. while (| )݇ < |ܵܣdo
3.
4.

if (| )ݏ < |ܵܣthen
if (ܷ[݅] ∈  )ܧthen
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Insert ܷ[݅] into ܵܣ
i++
5.
6.

else i++
else Insert ܷ[݅] into ܵܣ

7. call ܮ(ܴܥ݁ݐܽݎ݁݊݁ܩ, )ܵܣ
8. return ܴܥ
The equivalence class of the query issuer, E, privacy profile (݇, ݏ, ܣ ) and location
vector, L are supplied to the algorithm as input. It first tries to meet s-proximity by
inserting s nearest users into AS taken from E. Then it inserts other (k-s) nearest users
into the AS to meet k-anonymity. Finally the AS along with location vector, L is used to
construct the CR.

4.4.3 Attack Prevention: Formal Proof

We conclude this section by showing that our CR generation algorithm SNN-Cloak is
attack resistant.
Lemma: ܿ −  ܣܮreduces the probability of re-identification of actual query issuer.
Proof: Let, ݑ ∈ ܷ submits query ݏ( = ݎ, ܿ,  )݅ݏto the LA with her ݇-anonymity and ݏproximity requirement. The LA constructs two different anonymity sets ܵܣଵ and ܵܣଶ
applying SNN algorithm and NN algorithm [Kalnis07] respectively. ܵܣଵ meets both ݇anonymity and ݏ-proximity requirement however ܵܣଶ meets only ݇-anonymity.
Suppose, ܿ௫ be a context relevant to query  ݎand ݅ݏ௫ be a static user attribute
corresponding to ܿ௫ . Since ݑ is the actual query requester,
ݑ . ܿ[݅ݏ( ݒ௫ ]) = ݏ. ܿ(ݒ௫ ) … (1)
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Let, ܧ௫ be the equivalence class of ݑ with respect to ݅ݏ௫ . Then, ݑ . ܿ[݅ݏ( ݒ௫ ]) =
ݏ. ܿ(ݒ௫ ), ∀ݑ ∈ ܧ௫ … (2).
We

define,

ܧௌேே = ܧ௫ ∩ ܵܣଵ

and

ܧேே = ܧ௫ ∩ ܵܣଶ .

Hence,

ݑ . ܿ[݅ݏ( ݒ௫ ]) =

ݏ. ܿ(ݒ௫ ), ∀ݑ ∈ ܵܣଵ … (3)[SNN meets ݏ-proximity] Conversely,
∃ݑ ∈ ܵܣଶ | ݑ . ܿ[ ݅ݏ(ݒ௫ ]) ≠ ݏ. ܿ(ݒ௫ ), … (4) [NN does not meet ݏ-proximity] Using (3) and
(4) we get |ܧௌேே |> |ܧேே | … (5).
In ܵܣଵ the probability of re-identifying ݑ based on ܿ௫ and ݅ݏ௫ =

ଵ
|ாೄಿಿ |

Similarly, In ܵܣଶ the probability of re-identifying ݑ based on ܿ௫ and ݅ݏ௫ =
From (5) ⇒

ଵ
|ாೄಿಿ |

< |ா

ଵ

ಿಿ |

ଵ
|ாಿಿ |

. So, the SNN algorithm applied by ܿ −  ܣܮreduces the

probability of re-identification of actual query issuer.◊
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Chapter 5: Related Work

Gruteser et al. [Gruteser03] were the first to introduce cloaking technique known as
Interval Cloak (IC). They calculate CR based on a Quad-tree approach, where they
recursively partition the space into four equal squared regions until the user fits in a
quadrant where k-anonymity is satisfied. Another quad-tree variant using pyramid
structure called New Casper by Mokbel et al. [Mokbel06] achieves superior worst-case
complexity for calculating CR over IC [Gedik05]. Gedik et al. [Gedik05] introduced
privacy personalization framework and developed a CR algorithm known as Clique
Cloak (CC). It assigns Minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) for all the users and if the
users’ MBR intersects, they are eligible for forming a clique among themselves. kanonymity is satisfied if the user belongs to a k-cliqued region. Hilbert Cloak (HC)
introduced by Ghinita et al. [Ghinita07, Kalnis07] (HC) uses Hilbert’s Space-Filling
Curve to map user positions in 2-D space into 1-D values. These are subsequently
partitioned into groups/buckets of k users. HC finds the group to which a user belongs,
and returns the minimum bounding rectangle of the group as their CR. Nearest Neighbor
Cloak (NNC) by Kalnis et al. [Kalnis07] tries to make CR small by taking the MBR of
the nearest neighbors of a user. Bamba et al. [Bamba08] introduced PrivacyGrid (PG)
based cloaking technique. They have a similar grid structure like ours. However, the grid
is static and it does not consider users’ preferences in choosing grid resolution. LA in PG
knows the exact locations of users. The CR algorithm does not conform to reciprocity
condition as it computes CR for each user individually. They construct CR by expanding
in directions (North, South, East or West) by adding a row above the uppermost selected
row (or below the lowermost selected row) or a column to the right of the rightmost
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column (or to the left of the leftmost column). In this process their CR may take cells
where there is no user. Primary contribution of it is the introduction of l-diversity.
Matt Duckham et al. [Duckham05] first used an obfuscation technique without LA.
The negotiation process proposed by them may run for several iterations causing
prolonged service time and the more high QoS the user wants to avail the more private
information (less degradation of his actual location) he needs to reveal. Techniques
described in [Chow06, Kalnis07] eliminate anonymizer by considering mutual trust
among peers. But forming trust relationship in an open dynamic environment could be an
issue to begin with. The recent technique by Ghinita et al. [Ghinita08] uses a variant of
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) theory known as Computational PIR (CPIR) for
finding the approximate and exact Nearest neighbors of the Point of interests (POI). Due
to the overwhelming computational time techniques using PIR theory seem to be
infeasible for pervasive environment. CPIR used in [Ghinita08] also requires an
additional overhead of a huge list of POIs to be sent to the resource constrained device
and a malicious server may get into user’s private data though not in polynomial time. In
[Ghinita08] LSP can modify the grid regions at its will as it has control over selecting
granularity of grid design. Furthermore, [Ghinita08] imposes extra overhead in user side
in two ways: a user has to perform numerous cryptographic computations and he has to
maintain a secure communication channel. Following table summarizes the relevant
research works.
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TABLE 5.1 SUMMARY OF COMPARISON AMONG DIFFERENT CLOAKING APPROACHES
CR Approach

Generate CR for Reveals exact
each user/query location to LA

Requires secure
Reciprocity Vulnerable to Vulnerable
communication with
Condition
Attack 1 to Attack 2
LA

IC [Gruteser03]

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Casper[Mokbel06]

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

NNC[Kalnis07]

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

HC [Ghinita07]

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

PG [Bamba08]

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

SafeGrid

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Recently Mascetti et al. investigated a more general case in which the adversary is
able to recognize traces of LBS requests by the same anonymous user [Mascetti09]. They
introduced the notion of historical k-anonymity. In [Xu09] Xu et al. presented a novel
technique that allows a user’s location information to be reported as accurate as possible
while providing her sufficient location privacy protection. They also investigated the
problem of preventing an adversary from locating nodes based on their location
information they disclose in communications [Xu10]. They attempted to reduce location
resolution to achieve a desired level of safety protection and presented a novel
geographic routing protocol which can work with blurred location information. None of
these works addressed the notion of reciprocity condition.
Besides ensuring the reciprocity condition, our proposed approach intends to provide
location privacy solution satisfying k-anonymity along with s-proximity using a location
anonymizer. A thorough survey of literature reveals that lots of works have been done to
deal with location privacy but none has proposed the inclusion of parameter like sproximity. Existing approaches in achieving anonymity for the LBS services [Mokbel06,
Gedik05, Langheinrich02, Ghinita07] have ignored the fact that static information is
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required during the service access. In [Ghinita07] it is shown that the knowledge of the
attacker can be used to perform the re-identification attack. The selection of quasi
identifiers [Kalnis07, Sweeney02] from contextual information can place the individual
privacy at serious risk [Talukder08]. Most of the existing approaches in the literature fail
to

protect

identity

inference

caused

by

the

attacks

we

have

shown.

In

[Machanavajjhala06, Hashem07] it is shown how individual’s identity can be inferred
even from a k-anonymized data set. They proved that k-anonymity is not a sufficient
measure against re-identification attacks. To protect this, the notion of l-diversity is
proposed in [Machanavajjhala06] whereas [Hashem07] shows the weakness of l-diversity
and eliminates those by introducing the concept of t-closeness. These works are similar to
our approach. They showed the identity inference attacks in scenario of micro-data
publishing whereas we have formulated the attacks in case of using location based
services. The generic view of the problem was addressed while considering the disclosure
of a number of contexts and static information involved during the service access
[Talukder08]. They presented the concept of contexts of a query and related static user
information from a theoretical viewpoint. We provide a practical solution of the problem.
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Chapter 6: Experimental Evaluation

We set the simulation with North-American data set [Hoh05] and used our proposed
algorithms. Simulation was developed with Java 1.6 and it was conducted on a machine
with hardware configuration Intel M processor 1.7 GHz, 1.5 GB Memory and Windows
Vista as OS. First we evaluate our system and then we compare with IC [Gruteser03], HC
[Ghinita07], Casper [Mokbel06], NNC [Kalnis07] and PrivacyGrid [Bamba08].
There are two aspects of performance of a location privacy model. These are: level of
privacy, which is measured by achieved anonymity level, and quality of service (QOS).
QOS depends on two factors. At client side it is related to the processing time which
depends on the number of POI returned to the client and this eventually is determined by
the CR size. QOS also depends on the CR construction time at the location anonymizer.
We have conducted extensive analysis on how SafeGrid performs in terms of these
parameters.
Average size of cloaked region is an important performance metric because processing
time at the client side directly depends on it. The way SafeGrid constructs anonymization
sets makes higher anonymity requested in a cell significant. Once a cell is taken in a CR,
it is locked and users with lower k requirement are automatically put into the
corresponding AS. That is why kmax (maximum requested k by any user) is a significant
parameter and its impact on Avg CR size is depicted in Figure 6.1(a). As kmax increases,
Avg CR size gets larger. This means that for someone with abnormally high k
requirement, others’ QOS degrades a bit at the gain of increased privacy. As the total
number of users increases, more time is needed to construct CR (see Figure 6.1(b)). This
computation is performed at the location anonymizer, so it has little impact on the client
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side performance. We have compared performance of SafeGrid with the similar best
known approaches in literature like IC [Gruteser03], HC [Ghinita07], New Casper
[Mokbel06], NNC [Kalnis07] and PrivacyGrid [Bamba08]. All these approaches are
similar to SafeGrid as they involve location anonymizer for AS formation and CR
construction. Among them PrivacyGrid is the only grid based approach but it does not
meet reciprocity condition. Other approaches try to create optimal CR by reducing its size
and construction time. Only HC [Ghinita07] meets reciprocity condition.
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Figure 6.1(c) & (d) show clear improvement of SafeGrid over IC and New Casper in
terms of number of POI returned to the client. In SafeGrid, size of POI list returned to the
query requester remains almost constant as LA finally returns only the POIs locating
inside the query requester’s cell. This is how our approach resolves the tradeoff between
privacy and QOS (as claimed in section V(B)). Figure 6.1(e) exhibits that apparently
SafeGrid generates larger CRs compared to the peer solutions. However, if we consider
the size of effective CR, as shown in Fig 6.1(f), our approach gains much improvement
and even it is comparable to NNC [Kalnis07]. Moreover, from Figure 6.1(h) we find that
NNC takes very high CR construction time. Here we also find that SafeGrid reduces the
CR construction time and CR search time on average [see Fig 6.1(g) (h)]. Other
approaches perform poorly as they construct CR every time a new query is issued. These
data also demonstrate that SafeGrid is more scalable than others as increased number of
users cannot impact its performance.
We have implemented a prototype version of our proposed system. The modules of
context aware location anonymizer were developed on a machine with hardware
configuration Intel Processor 1.7 Ghz, 1.5 GB Memory and Windows Vista as OS. We
have deployed an application that uses, on client side, a Dell Axim X50v pocket PC
(Processor type is Intel 624 MHz Xscale, ROM is 128MB Flash). The underlying OS is
WinCE and the implementation language is C# on .NET Compact framework.
The spatial data used in the evaluation were taken from North American data set
[Hoh05] consisted of 15K points which were used by clients and the LA as user points in
2D space. Figure 4 depicts how the client module works. The initialization step
consisting of the user registration tasks are shown in Figure 6.2 (a) (b). The subsequent
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figures display how a registered user submits location based query to the LA and gets
reply subsequently.

(a) User selects her preferred services

(b) User provides required profile and privacy
information

(c) User submits query

(d) Reply from LA with failure notification

Figure 6.2 Prototype Implementation (User Interface Module)

We have evaluated performance of our final system, which implements both kanonymity and s-proximity, and the findings are summarized in Figure 6.3. Performance
of the system was measured in terms of the metrics: Query Success Rate, CR
Construction Time and CR Size (absolute /relative). The percentage of time a user was
provided with her required service was denoted by Query Success Rate. Other two
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metrics measured the time required for constructing a cloaked region and the size of the
constructed CR. As Figure 6.3 (a) depicts, we achieved overall high success rate though it
reduced a bit with higher proximity requirement. The graphs in Figure 6.3 (b) (C)
demonstrate that the construction time and size of a cloaked region increases with higher
proximity level. These parameters also show higher values for increased number of
subscribers. Performance of our prototype implementation was compared with couple of
other existing systems (IC [Gruteser03], HC [Ghinita07], Casper [Mokbel06], NNC
[Kalnis07]) and it is found that our approach yields cloaked region with a bit large size
(shown in Figure 6.3 (d)) which is quite acceptable considering the enhanced level of
privacy it offers compared to the existing frameworks.
From the experimental facts it is evident that our proposed framework with a context
aware location anonymizer is really feasible to be implemented in real world LBS
system. Performance of the system is acceptable as compared to existing systems. The
system implements both s-proximity and k-anonymity which is a novel approach capable
of safeguarding the attacks presented in this paper.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work

Location-based Services (LBS) have become very popular in these days due to the
increasing trend of high-end smart-phone usage. Yet, this popularity is sometimes
diminished by the concern of end users’ location privacy violation. The concern stems
from the disclosure of location information by the end user or request issuer of LBS when
he or she submits the location-dependent query or spatial query to the service provider.
Various methods found in the literature protect location privacy by hiding or obfuscating
exact location with several other users’ location in the system from the service provider.
However, none of the methods is still able to provide location based services with full
immunity from privacy attacks. The concluding note of this thesis includes a summary of
overall contributions and future directions for the research.
7.1 Contribution of the Thesis

In this thesis, we introduce several novel attacks causing serious privacy concern to
LBS. In this sort of attacks, the exact location of the requester can be inferred by the
adversary through obtaining cloaking regions (CR) that are shrunk or extended in
subsequent queries. The remedy to this problem is to retain cloaking regions that contain
the same set of users over a period of time (reciprocity condition). Most of the existing
approaches demonstrate a fundamental flaw by considering only a static snapshot of users
during evaluation. Thus, any modification to the data structure due to mobile user
location update turns out to be very costly. Our proposed approach is principled on
developing disjoint sets of users dynamically over time in order to share the common
CRs.
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In addition, we have proposed a location privacy solution with a trusted third party (cLA) equipped with additional functionalities which are accomplished prior to AS
construction. The algorithms presented in this thesis aim to construct an AS which meets
k-anonymity and s-proximity. The novel privacy feature s-proximity is proposed as a
solution of couple of plausible attacks applicable against most of the existing approaches.
We have implemented a prototype version of the system. Evaluation results demonstrate
the feasibility of our proposed approach along with its performance measures. The
experimental study supports our claim that SafeGrid is efficient and suitable for the
mobile environment compared to other approaches. In future, we plan to build real world
LBS applications using the SafeGrid framework.
7.2 Broader Impact of the Research

The major contribution of the research will be an attack-resistant privacy protection
technique for Location-based Services running on resource constrained handheld devices
that use a Location Anonymizer. The application designers can benefit through adopting
this approach in their designs and tailoring it to their specific needs by regulating various
system parameters. The research will have a wide range of impacts on the traffic
monitoring system, weather forecast system, health care industry (personal tracking
system), corporate office premise (internal messenger system), school campus (buddy
locator, campus map), customer support (tracking application to ensure quality of
service), advertisement, marketing, tourism industry and many more.
SafeGrid is going to add new dimension to location privacy research in LBS where
typically the networks are comprised of resource-constrained mobile devices. The
researchers and the students who work in this area will be able to look into and further
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contribute to the research results of the thesis, which will be made publicly available.
The data sets used and experimental results to evaluate the protection model in the thesis
can be used in promoting research in this area. Finally, the research will benefit the
research community to advance in the location privacy research with the new dimensions
of thinking, and provide the handheld device programmers a unique opportunity to model
privacy in their applications, facilitating the onward journey of pervasive computing.
The proposed location privacy framework is generic and flexible so it can be easily
incorporated into existing and new systems that attempt to better protect users’ identities
and their private information, without major modifications to the system and network
infrastructure. The proposed approach challenges the traditional belief of the zero-sum
tradeoffs between privacy and QoS, which can result in a major paradigm shift. The
research outcome will effectively disseminate this new paradigm to the next generation of
workforce in the related fields. It will help to the research community to develop new
ideas and solutions when handling the privacy and security issues in location based
systems and other distributed systems.
7.3 Future Work

The proposed framework SafeGrid, indeed, opens up new avenues for research in
location privacy in LBS. Enforcement of reciprocity requirement and identity inference
protection are the most interesting aspects of our approach, which the existing approaches
have repeatedly ignored in most cases. Some of the future research scopes of SafeGrid
and LBS privacy are discussed here.
The performance of SafeGrid can be analyzed by investigating the dynamic
reorganization of data structure on user movement with trees of other orders, such as
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ternary trees. It is important to check how it performs in a dynamic environment with
varying speeds of users in a simulated environment. In addition, we plan to compare its
performance with other interesting choices of greedy heuristic that can determine disjoint
anon sets of neighboring users.
The industry is constantly aiming at taking handheld devices like PDAs, cell
phones, and smart phones to the next frontier of technology by accommodating more
processing and storage capability. Battery power, however, stands as the bottleneck to
long hours of continuous operation for these devices. With faster new gadgets and the
requirements for trusting a third party LA, researchers have become very keen on
investigating LBS models that get rid of LA [Chow06, Hashem07, Ghinita06,Ghinita08].
The peer-to -peer models [Chow06, Hashem07, Ghinita06] require that the peers
establish trust relationships among themselves and share exact location information. In
practice, this principle may even raise more privacy concerns. In the approach depicted
by Ghinita et. al [Ghinita08], the user retrieves a list of POIs through Private information
retrieval method [Chor95] from the LBS. In this way, LBS doesn’t know what
information has been requested, and sends the data structure on selected POIs (stored as
Voronoi Tessellation with POIs) to the user prior to issuing a query. The user selects a
number of POIs from the list and sends back to the server in order to determine the CR,
which doesn’t involve any anon level. The issues with this approach are that the density
control of the POIs is arbitrary at the provider’s end, and the additional overhead of
filtering the result set is now the query issuer’s task. Future direction of privacy research
in LBS is to find robust privacy measure, suitable data structures and secured protocol to
support the very nature of resource-constrained devices.
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